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Abstract
Scientic conicts often stem from dierences in the conceptual
framework through which scientists view and understand their own
eld. In this chapter, I analyze the ontological and methodological
assumptions of three traditions in evolutionary biology, namely, Ernst
Mayr's population thinking, the gene-centered view of the Modern Syn-
thesis (MS), and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). Each
of these frameworks presupposes a dierent account of \evolutionary
causes," and this discrepancy prevents mutual understanding and ob-
jective evaluation in the recent contention surrounding the EES. From
this perspective, the chapter characterizes the EES research program
as an attempt to introduce causal structures beyond genes as addi-
tional units of evolution, and compares its research methodology and
objectives with those of the traditional MS framework.
To appear in: Vienna Series in Theoretical Biology: Evolutionary Causation, T. Uller
and K. Laland (eds), The MIT Press.
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1 Introduction
Disagreements and conicts are part and parcel of scientic practice. Mu-
tual criticisms among opposing hypotheses, interpretations, and approaches
are crucial ingredients for a healthy and productive science that prevent it
from lapsing into dogmatism. Some of these problems are empirical and set-
tled by direct observations or experiments. Others are less so and concern
meta-scientic beliefs about how to interpret data or conduct experiments.
The recent debate (e.g., Laland et al., 2014) between the Modern Synthesis
(MS) and the so-called Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES), I believe,
falls into the latter category. This chapter aims to substantiate this claim by
focusing on the ontological and methodological frameworks of evolutionary
theory. From this perspective I diagnose the current controversy as stem-
ming from dissident views on both the ontological units of evolution and the
proper methodology for studying their dynamics.
By ontology I mean a set of beliefs shared (mostly implicitly) by a group
of scientists about basic entities and properties thereof that populate the
domain of their investigation. Any scientic theory has its ontological as-
sumptions as to what constitute the bricks and mortar of the world-picture
according to that theory. The world of classical mechanics is lled with
particles having denite location and momentum. Freud postulated an un-
conscious id, libidos, etc., as basic psychological mechanisms. These onto-
logical postulates are deeply linked to the notion of causality. To be is to be
causally eective | no empirical theory postulates the existence of a thing
that would never aect or be aected by anything else, and if it posits some-
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thing it must specify how and in what way that thing is causally related
to the rest of the world. A scientic theory aims to elucidate this causal
structure of the world. This implies that the ontology of a theory, along
with its concept of causality, prescribes scientic methodology and practice.
The goal of psychoanalysis is to bring unconscious conicts into the con-
scious mind through therapeutic intervention. Dalton's atomic theory led
chemists to study chemical reactions in terms of combinations, separations,
and rearrangements of atoms. Conversely, methodological postulates and
abilities, i.e., what we can do and observe, inuence our idea of what there
is in the rst place (\electrons exist if we can spray them," says Hacking,
1983). Thus the ontology, the concept of causality, and the methodology of
a theory together determine a conceptual framework through which we see
and investigate the world.
Shared ontology and methodology facilitate communication among sci-
entists working in the same eld and enable them to evaluate each other's
work. The lack thereof, in contrast, often times leads to miscommunication
or erce discussions, or what Kuhn (1962) notoriously called the incommen-
surability between dierent paradigms. Even to a lesser extent, discordance
in meta-scientic assumptions prevents mutual understanding and collabo-
rations in a scientic community. This is especially so with biology, which
comprises a vast variety of disciplines with dierent traditions, agendas, and
methodologies. The spirit of the Modern Synthesis, epitomized by Dobzhan-
sky's \nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution," was
to bring a unity to the heterogeneous biological sciences under the same con-
ceptual framework of evolutionary theory. But what is evolutionary theory?
3
Since Darwin, the principle of descent with modication (due to various
factors, including natural selection) has been conceptualized in dierent,
sometimes incompatible, ways, and that has given rise to debate over what
really the theory of evolution really is, even among the constructors of the
Modern Synthesis (Smocovitis, 1996).
As I see it, what are often at issue in these debates are the ontology and
methodology of evolutionary theory. That is, the dissonance comes from
dierent views on what count as units and causes of evolution, and how
we should study their dynamics. This chapter illustrates this by analyz-
ing meta-scientic assumptions underlying three contemporary evolution-
ary thoughts: Ernst Mayr's population thinking, the gene-centered view of
the Modern Synthesis, and the recently proposed Extended Evolutionary
Synthesis. They view evolution dierently. For Mayr, it is a change in
a heterogeneous population of organisms triggered by environmental fac-
tors; for the gene-centered view, it is a shift in gene frequencies resulting
from the variation in their phenotypic eects; and the EES takes the whole
organism-environmental complex as both units and causes of evolutionary
changes. Even in cases where they refer to the same \phenomenon," its
interpretation and signicance depend on the conceptual framework of each
tradition. I hope clarifying these ontological and methodological assump-
tions in detail will help to understand the source of their disagreements and
to facilitate further communication and discussion among dierent schools
of evolutionary thought.
The chapter unfolds as follows. Section 2 begins the aforementioned
meta-scientic analysis by taking up Ernst Mayr's population thinking as
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the rst explicit attempt to build a unied ontology and methodology for
evolutionary theory. At variance with the conventional interpretation, how-
ever, I argue that it falls short of the conceptual framework for the Modern
Synthesis because of its inherent inconsistency with the Mendelian, gene-
centered ontology. As will be discussed in Section 3, the ontological frame-
work of the MS was completed when genes were recognized as exclusive
units underlying both organismic and evolutionary phenomena. This onto-
logical shift came to feature population genetics as the default methodology
to study evolutionary change. Section 4 then characterizes the EES as an
alternative to this gene-centric picture which tries to treat whole complex
causal mechanisms over genotype, phenotype, and environment as extended
units of evolution. I illustrate a part of this attempt using the causal graph
theory, and describe some research questions suggested from this perspec-
tive. In conclusion, Section 5 summarizes the MS and the EES frameworks
as competing research programs (Lakatos, 1980), and sketches challenges and
tasks for both camps with a view towards generating constructive discussion
and theory development in future investigations.
2 Population Thinking
Great scientic works do not just reveal novel phenomena or regularities in
the world but they also change how we see the world itself. That was the
case for Darwin's Origin, in which he not only presented an overwhelming
mass of evidence and mechanisms of evolutionary changes, but also provided
a new way of looking at life. Darwin's conceptual revolution was eloquently
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epitomized by Ernst Mayr as the replacement of typological thinking by
population thinking. Typological thinking, according to Mayr, has been the
canonical view of living things since Aristotle, and denes an organism in
terms of its essence. An essence is what species the nature of an individual
organism as a member of a certain species. It is an unchanging standard
ontologically prior to any within-specic dierence or variation, which is
conceived only as deviation from the essence. In contrast, population think-
ing puts the variation as primitive; biological populations are inherently
heterogeneous and there is no xed property shared by all members of a
given species. Evolution is a necessary consequence of this variability when
it is heritable and related to tness. This made the assumption of xed
type unnecessary for, or even orthogonal to, evolutionary theory. What is
crucial is rather that organisms vary from each other, and that some of their
variations are heritable and have tness eects.
Population thinking is an ontological thesis. It takes organisms as onto-
logical primitives in the sense that they are all idiosyncratic, with any ap-
parent commonality traditionally conceived as essence or type being merely
a statistical abstraction that has no real existence.
The populationist stresses the uniqueness of everything in the
organic world. . . All organisms and organic phenomena are com-
posed of unique features and can be described collectively only in
statistical terms. . . Averages are merely statistical abstractions;
only the individuals of which the populations are composed have
reality (Mayr, 1975, p. 28).
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For Mayr, this is the only ontological doctrine compatible with the Dar-
winian theory of evolution. Natural selection could not occur if populations
were homogeneous, and evolution would be impossible if there were xed
types. To deny population thinking, therefore, is to deny selection and evo-
lution.
The replacement of the typological ontology by the populationist on-
tology is accompanied by a conceptual shift in the notion of causality and
scientic methodology. For typological thinkers, the essence of a thing is
also the locus of its causal power, so that behavior, properties, and reg-
ularities exhibited by an object are determined and accounted for by its
internal nature or structure. Typically, such inherent regularities are inves-
tigated in experiments that attempt to control all external variables and
carefully isolate the causative agent under study so that it exhibits its \own
course of nature." This, according to Mayr (1961), is the canonical con-
cept of causation and methodology in physics, chemistry, and also what he
calls \functional" biology that studies proximate causes or mechanisms of
biological phenomena. Population thinking, however, implies that this un-
derstanding of causality is utterly inadequate and inapplicable for the study
of evolution, simply because there is no xed essence. Evolutionary biology
thus requires a dierent concept of causality that does not rely on essences,
and that is what Mayr calls ultimate cause. Ultimate causes are historical
factors; what explains the outcome of evolution, for example, the radiation
of mammals during the Paleocene and Eocene, is past environmental con-
ditions such as the extinction of dinosaurs, which itself was triggered by an
asteroid impact. Mayr (1982) claims that such causal relationships are iden-
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tied not by experiments but rather by historical narratives that connect
points of past singular events into a consistent sequence of causal story.
The typological/populationist dichotomy is thus closely tied to the method-
ological distinction of proximate/ultimate causation. The onto-methodological
dichotomy served for Mayr as a criterion to distinguish what does and does
not count as an appropriate study of evolution. With this standard he
condemned ahistorical approaches such as the phenetic species concept or
mathematical genetics as typological (Mayr, 1982, p.41), and dismissed the
accumulating knowledge in molecular, developmental, and physiological bi-
ology as irrelevant to the study of evolution because they are concerned with
only proximate but not ultimate causes. In contrast, natural history, which
studies natural habitats of populations and historical change thereof, is ex-
pected to play the central role in identifying ultimate causes of evolutionary
trajectories. Although Mayr's appraisal here might have reected his terri-
torial ambition to some extent (Beatty, 1994), what should be noted is that
his criticism was made on a conceptual, rather than empirical, ground. Mayr
did not, for example, question theoretical results in mathematical genetics
or empirical ndings in molecular biology; but for him they contribute lit-
tle, if anything, to our understanding of evolution, as it requires a dierent
notion of causality and methodology.
In sum, population thinking for Mayr was not just a metaphysical corol-
lary of Darwin's theory but rather a conceptual framework that helped him
to dene the very discipline of evolutionary theory both ontologically (what
it is about) and methodologically (how it works). The ip side of this demar-
cation was the ostracism or marginalization of molecular and developmental
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studies on proximate mechanisms as they were deemed irrelevant or periph-
eral to the study of evolution. Another important omission is Mendelian
genetics. Population thinking is just Darwinian | Mayr presents it as Dar-
win's exclusive legacy with no mention of Mendel. This raises serious doubts
as to whether population thinking serves as an adequate ontological basis
for the Modern Synthesis, which by denition was the synthesis of Darwin's
theory of evolution and Mendel's theory of inheritance.1 In fact, Mendelian
genetics brings an inconvenient tension into population thinking by reintro-
ducing the notion of types (allelo- or genotypes), so that studying evolution
as a change in gene frequencies requires a dierent ontology. This is the core
claim of Dawkins' gene-centered view, to which we now turn.
3 The Gene-Centered View
Although variation is certainly essential for natural selection as popula-
tion thinkers emphasize, it is not sucient to produce signicant adaptive
change. Since most variation is small, selection must be cumulative and
operate for several generations to yield any notable dierence. This posed a
serious problem for Darwin, who postulated a sort of blending inheritance;
if parents' characters \blended" in their ospring the variation in a pop-
ulation would quickly fade away before selection produces any signicant
change, making it a negligible factor of evolution. As is well known, the
problem came to be settled by the integration of Mendelian genetics into
1Witteveen (2015, 2016) tracks down the historical process in which Mayr has appro-
priated, with his own twist, the type/population distinction from its earlier articulation
by Simpson and Dobzhansky.
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Darwin's theory (Provine, 2001), but this has also reintroduced the notion
of type into evolutionary thinking by reducing organismal features into ex-
changeable and infusible genes. The genetic reduction was completed by
Fisher's (1918) seminal work, which showed that even apparently continu-
ous variation can be expressed as dierential combinations of alleles which
are themselves discrete. The Darwinian notion of a population of heteroge-
neous individual organisms was thus replaced by the concept of a gene pool,
which consists of relatively few kinds of genotypes or allelotypes.
Through the 20th century the gene-centered view has further been but-
tressed by the works of T. H. Morgan, W. D. Hamilton, and G. C. Williams,
to name a few, but it was Richard Dawkins who emphasized the conceptual
signicance of the discrete inheritance for adaptive evolution and erected
it into the ontological basis of evolutionary theory. Although he does not
mention it explicitly, Dawkins' target was the populationist-like ontology.
Population thinking stressed the uniqueness of individual organisms as its
fundamental axiom. Dawkins accepts this premise, but concludes that be-
cause of this uniqueness adaptive evolution cannot occur at the individual
level. \Each individual is unique. You cannot get evolution by selecting be-
tween entities when there is only one copy of each entity!" (Dawkins, 1976,
p. 34). Most selective pressure is weak, so if it is to produce a signicant
adaptation a population must undergo multiple rounds of selection and the
result of each round must accumulate. This requires units of adaptation
to be persistent and to exert a constant tness eect across generations.
Whereas individual organisms, being idiosyncratic and ephemeral, cannot
do this job, genes responsible for phenotypic dierences are \virtually im-
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mortal" and can serve as bearers of cumulative adaptation. Hence it is
genes that evolve in the rst sense, while changes in individual phenotypes
are epiphenomena of the underlying genetic evolution.
Dawkins describes himself as oering \a particular way of looking at
animals and plants" (Dawkins, 1982, p. 1). I would call it an ontology, for
the claim really concerns what kinds of entities make up the living world.
The fundamental building blocks of evolution in his view are called active
germ-line replicators. They play two important roles in adaptive evolution;
namely, i) to form a possibly innite lineage of identical copies (replicas),
making themselves a bearer of cumulative adaptation, and ii) to exert con-
stant causal eects on phenotype and tness, thereby inuencing their prob-
ability of being copied. Note that these are both important characteristics
of what philosophers call \type." A type is characterized by its identical
nature and causal power; e.g., every instance of gold is assumed to have
the same atomic structure and chemical activity, and such an in-class ho-
mogeneity is what makes gold a chemical type. Likewise, every instance of
an active germ-line replicator is identical by descent, and assumedly has the
same tness eect if put in the same environmental condition. Adaptive
evolution is understood as a race among such types, each of which increases
or decreases its share as a consequence of its type-specic tness eect.2
The gene-centered ontology does not leave the notion of evolutionary
cause intact. The focus on the gradual and cumulative nature of adaptive
2It is no wonder, therefore, that the controversy over the gene-centered view has fo-
cused on these two alleged features of gene-as-type. The notion of identical genes must
be reconciled with mutation and recombination (Dawkins, 1982, ch. 5), whereas the as-
sumption of constant phenotypic eect has been criticized as being untenable on the face
of gene-by-gene or gene-by-environment interactions (Wimsatt, 1980; Lloyd, 1988).
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evolution pushes historical and/or environmental conditions to the back-
ground and instead features genes as a major driving force of evolution-
ary changes. An active replicator \exerts phenotypic power over its world"
(Dawkins, 1982, p. 91) | ADH1B allele enables rapid alcohol breakdown
and the SD gene has a capacity to kill ies' sperms that do not carry its copy
to favor its own transmission | and by doing so they aect their frequency
in future generations. The study of evolutionary dynamics, then, boils down
to an analysis of the \phenotypic power" of the underlying gene.3 Each al-
lele has its own capacity | presumably thanks to its nucleotide sequence
and place within the genome | to produce a phenotype, to segregate, to
mutate, to recombine, etc. Population genetics quanties manifestations of
such capacities in a given environmental condition and deduces equations
that describe evolutionary dynamics under that environment. In this sense,
the practice of population genetics is quite Aristotelian sensu Cartwright
(1999): it studies the natural capacity of genes, and derives laws of evolu-
tion as deployments of their nature under a specied condition.
The gene-centered view thus presents quite a dierent ontology and
methodology than those of population thinking. A biological population now
consists of combinations of discrete types rather than heterogeneous individ-
uals, and changes its composition as a function of the phenotypic power of
such types. The redenition of evolution as a change in gene frequencies fea-
tures population genetics as the primary methodology to study evolutionary
3Note that the \phenotypic power" of a gene may be silent or neutral. In this sense,
neutral evolution stands on the same, gene-centered ontology as neo-Darwinism. They
disagree on the relative importance of various evolutionary forces (drift vs. selection), but
share the same ontological framework.
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dynamics. In order for it to be regarded as a bona de evolutionary process,
any hypothesized evolutionary mechanism must be expressed in terms ei-
ther of the phenotypic eect of genes or of environmental conditions, and its
evolutionary signicance must be evaluated with an appropriate population-
genetic model. That was how natural selection and drift became accepted
as major forces of evolutionary changes around a century and a half-century
ago, respectively, so surely shouldn't any other hypothetical mechanism go
through the same procedure? The onto-methodological framework of the
gene-centered view has thus come to serve as the touchstone to distinguish
what is and what is not a proper study of evolution in the Modern Synthe-
sis framework | even to the extent that \nothing in evolution makes sense
except in light of population genetics" (Lynch, 2007).
4 The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis
The Modern Synthesis and its underlying gene-centered ontology has proven
to be a very productive framework that has promoted a host of empirical
ndings as well as theoretical developments including, to name a few, neu-
tral theory and inclusive tness theory. Its hegemony, however, has recently
been challenged by those who work on varieties of evolutionary mechanisms
such as developmental bias, plasticity, niche construction, or epigenetic in-
heritance. Growing evidence from these studies suggests the mechanisms
underlying evolution are too complex and diverse to be adequately captured
by the MS framework | phenotypic variations are not random but canalized
through developmental processes; organisms are not just passive \vehicles"
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of adaptation but actively interact with their environment to inuence their
evolutionary fate; and inheritance is mediated not just by genes but also
by other epigenetic, environmental, and cultural means. Some believe that
these ndings go beyond the scope of the traditional, gene-centered ap-
proach and necessitate a conceptual update, which they call the Extended
Evolutionary Synthesis or EES (Muller and Pigliucci, 2010; Laland et al.,
2015).
This plea for reform is countered by those who work on the forefront of
the Modern Synthesis framework (Laland et al., 2014; Welch, 2016). They
doubt the alleged \novel" evolutionary mechanisms are anything more than
just \add-ons" or other fancy ways genes exerts their causal power. De-
velopmental bias, for example, is just another name for a particular way
genes get expressed, plasticity an environmental-dependent expression of
genotype, niche construction a kind of \extended phenotype," and epige-
netic factors are merely other gene-like entities with a peculiar transmission
pattern. Construed as such, these mechanisms can be well handled by the
existing population-genetic models with modest adjustments and proper pa-
rameterization. Of course these modications should aect evolutionary tra-
jectories, but by themselves they are not essential, or at least not anything
that require a signicant extension or overhaul of the current evolutionary
theory, or so the skeptics argue.
The contention here is not whether these phenomena exist | both camps
agree that developmental bias, niche construction, etc., are real, and maybe
common, phenomena | but rather it is about their signicance to evolu-
tionary theory. The populationist thinker, for example, would dismiss these
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factors as mere variations in proximate mechanisms with no direct impli-
cation for evolutionary studies of ultimate causes. From the gene-centered
perspective, they are background parameters regulating genes' actions and
whose evolutionary signicance is evaluated only in terms of genetic changes.
Proponents of the EES resist these interpretations on two fronts. First, they
deny the sharp distinction between proximate/ultimate causation in favor of
\reciprocal" relationships between development and evolution (Laland et al.,
2011). Second, they argue for a holistic view of evolution where epigenome,
developmental processes, and niche all count as their own evolutionary units
that together constitute population dynamics irreducible to changes in gene
frequencies (Laland et al., 2015). The EES claims that taken together these
ideas suggest a new perspective or \conceptual framework" that has dif-
ferent points of emphasis and research questions than those of the Modern
Synthesis framework.
At the same time, Laland and colleagues emphasize that the EES is
not a refutation or replacement but an extension of the traditional view.
This requires us to coordinate their reformist claims vis-a-vis the Modern
Synthesis framework | what must be extended, and in what way? In what
follows, I try to nd answers to these questions in line with what has been
developed so far, by characterizing the \extension" claimed by the EES as
concerning the ontology and methodology of evolutionary theory.
Extended ontology
One of the central tenets of the EES is that mechanisms underlying evo-
lution are more complex and diverse than the Modern Synthesis often pre-
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supposes, and that makes a dierence in evolutionary trajectories. But how
do proximate causal mechanisms inuence ultimate evolutionary dynamics?
Despite Mayr's strict segregation, the fact that the two sorts of causes are
systematically related can be shown by the causal graph theory, which deals
with formal relationships between a causal structure represented by a di-
rected graph and a probability distribution generated from it (see box). The
graphical representation has been used to illustrate causal assumptions un-
derlying the standard quantitative genetic models (Frank, 1997; Rice, 2004;
Otsuka, 2016a), but it also allows us to characterize \non-standard" evolu-
tionary mechanisms as modications to the standard causal model (Otsuka,
2015). In the extended causal models, epigenetic inheritance introduces an
extra pathway between the parental and ospring phenotypes, while a niche
is represented as a \contextual variable" constructed by individuals in a
local population and inherited to the next generation (Fig. 2). Upon pa-
rameterization, these models induce probability distributions, from which
evolutionary dynamics under each causal hypothesis can be calculated. The
resulting equations unequivocally and quantitatively show that dierence in
the underlying mechanisms is reected in the evolutionary change of the
population.
Box: The causal reconstruction of evolutionary models is based on two
assumptions. The rst is the Price equation (Price, 1970), which gives
the evolutionary change of any phenotypic mean between two genera-
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tions by
Z = Cov(W;Z 0)=W + Z 0   Z (1)
where W , Z, and Z 0 respectively denote tness, phenotype, and the av-
erage ospring phenotypic value of each individual. The second is the
assumption of the causal graph theory that the probability distribution of
the population is generated from a causal model (Wright, 1920; Spirtes
et al., 1993; Pearl, 2000). A causal model M = hG;F ; P i has three
components: the causal or path graph G that qualitatively represents
cause-eect relationships with directed edges, the set of structural equa-
tions F that specify the quantitative nature of each causal relationship
in the graph, and the probability distribution P over exogenous variables
(those that have no causal input in the model). Fig. 1 is an example
of a simple causal model of selection and reproduction in an asexually
reproducing population. Given a genetic distribution P (X) as an input,
the model yields a joint distribution out of which the right hand side of
the Price equation (1) can be calculated. If all the causal relationships
are linear, the model in Fig. 1 yields the breeder's equation Z = Sh2
(Otsuka, 2016a). By modifying the causal model (graph and functions)
one may obtain evolutionary dynamics for dierent mechanisms.
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Figure 1: the causal model of the breeder's equation for an asexually re-
producing population. Xs, Z, and W respectively represent allele counts, phe-
notype, and tness of a parent, whereas X 0s and Z 0 denote averages over o-
spring. Environmental inuences (Es) are assumed to be independent and
omitted from the graph. Parameters  and  represent additive genetic eects
and the selection gradient, respectively. The graph and the structural equa-
tions (in the middle) together induce a probability distribution, from which
evolutionary change is calculated.
In the traditional model (Fig. 1), genes take full responsibility for both
selection (as the eventual cause of tness) and reproduction (as the sole me-
diator of parent-ospring resemblance). The streamlined picture justies one
to take genes as the primary causal agent of evolution, while pulling together
development and other environmental factors as background conditions that
regulate the genetic action (Fig. 3, left). As a natural consequence, organis-
mic features or behaviors come to be understood as properties or capacities
of a genome, e.g., niche construction as an \extended phenotype" and plas-
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Figure 2: Causal graphs and resulting evolutionary equations for epigenetic
inheritance (left) and niche construction (right). The right pathway through
X summarizes the genetic inheritance as represented in Fig. 1. The epi-
genetic factor C and niche R both create additional pathways connecting
parental tnessW and ospring variables Z 0 or R0, thereby inuencing adap-
tive dynamics. The evolutionary response under each mechanism is obtained
under the assumption of linear causal relationships. See Otsuka (2015) for
details.
ticity as a conditional gene expression in response to a changing environment.
The gene-centric picture, however, does not t well with the extended mod-
els where extra-genetic and environmental factors form additional causal
pathways underlying selection and inheritance in parallel with the genome
(Fig. 2). Here, these factors serve no longer as background parameters but
rather as variables that change their distribution | that is, evolve | in re-
sponse to their tness eect. Hence, in order for a model to be dynamically
sucient and to correctly predict evolutionary change, an evolving popu-
lation must be characterized not by its genetic composition alone but also
19
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Figure 3: Schematic representations of adaptive evolution according to the
MS and the EES. Left: in the gene-centered view, genes are the principal
factor of both selection and reproduction, with other phenotypic and en-
vironmental factors regulating the genetic action. Right: in the extended
picture, it is the whole causal structure involving genetic as well as non-
genetic variables that generates evolutionary dynamics. Various develop-
mental and environmental processes are parts or properties of this causal
structure, rather than the genome alone.
by epigenetic, phenotypic, and even environmental variables related to each
other via a certain causal network. This suggests an inclusive ontology that
takes the entire causal structure as the generator of evolutionary dynamics
and the basic unit of its analysis (Fig. 3, right). Accordingly, various evolu-
tionary mechanisms such as niche construction or developmental plasticity
are re-construed as structural properties, e.g., as a particular conguration
of a causal graph or a form of structural equations.
The shift in the ontological focus from genes to structures has implica-
tions for the notion of evolutionary cause. Traditional evolutionary thinking
has assumed a dualistic, gure-ground concept of causality, where the no-
tion of causes is divided into two categories, only one of which is granted
primary importance in evolutionary studies. Population thinkers set a strict
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boundary between ultimate causes of evolution and proximate mechanisms.
Neo-Darwinians draw genes as the central \gure" that drives evolutionary
change on the \ground" of environmental or developmental conditions. In
contrast, the EES upholds an univocal and democratic view of causality,
which denies the sharp distinction between proximate and ultimate causa-
tion, or between a primary causal agent and background conditions. The
systematic derivation of evolutionary equations from causal models of prox-
imate mechanisms demonstrates that proximate causes are ultimate causes
of evolution (Otsuka, 2015). It also shows that evolutionary dynamics is de-
termined not solely by a gene's capacity, but from the entire causal structure
including genotype, phenotype, and environment as its parts. Of course this
does not mean all these factors make an equal contribution; the genome will
remain one of or perhaps the most important factor and for that reason it is
privileged in studies of evolution, but its causal and evolutionary signicance
can be evaluated only within the network of organismal and environmen-
tal factors. Or, in other words, evolutionary change is a function not of
genes alone but of the entire causal structure, so that there is no ontological
justication to distinguish gure and ground in the kinds of evolutionary
causes.
Extended methodology
In the Modern Synthesis framework, genes serve as the primary unit of
evolutionary analysis. Models of population genetics study how evolution-
ary dynamics, dened in terms of genetic frequencies, arises from genes'
capacities or properties under a given condition. By shifting the focus of
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analysis from genes to entire causal structures, the EES rather asks how
the evolutionary dynamics of a population is generated and constrained by
the underlying structure. Does this justify treating causal structures as an
additional unit of evolution? The argument for genes as the primary unit
derives its force from their ability to inuence evolutionary processes, their
stability across generations, and their changeability via mutation | these
three features together qualied genes as the inductive basis of evolutionary
analyses. If causal structures are to play a similar role, we must likewise ask
how they aect evolution, are conserved across generations or even among
species, and \mutate" and evolve through time. This prompts three research
questions as described below.
Recent studies in Evo-Devo have suggested that developmental processes
may bias or constrain phenotypic variability and thereby inuence the rate
and direction of evolutionary change (see Laland et al., 2015, and refer-
ences therein). Analyzing this relationship will constitute the rst line of
research to evaluate the role of causal structures on evolutionary dynam-
ics. Although short-term constraints on adaptive processes have often been
studied through the (eigen) structure of the G matrix (e.g., Hansen, 2006;
Blows, 2007), it only provides a temporary measure because genetic variation
keeps changing due to selection, drift, mutation, and so on. To understand
a longer-term evolvability one needs to turn to the source of these genetic
variations, which is in turn determined by structural features of the under-
lying developmental/causal pathways. It is expected, for example, that two
sets of traits will evolve independently from each other if they do not share
developmental resources and form distinct modules (Wagner and Altenberg,
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1996). On the other hand, generative entrenchment contributes to the evo-
lutionary conservatism of early developmental stages through a strong sta-
bilizing selection on their broad downstream eect (Wimsatt and Schank,
1988). Qualitative features of developmental/causal structures thus deter-
mine both properties of the mutation matrix and selective regime, thereby
inuencing evolutionary dynamics. These relationships between possible
phenotypic distributions and the underlying causal structure are summa-
rized by the so-called Markov condition (Spirtes et al., 1993; Pearl, 2000, see
also Fig. 4). The systematic relationship allows one to infer unknown causal
structures from phenotypic records (Shipley, 2000; Valente et al., 2010; Ot-
suka, 2016b), or to derive qualitative predictions on long-term evolutionary
trajectories from known causal structures.
The second type of research concerns extrapolations of evolutionary mod-
els from one context to another. Many models of population/quantitative
genetics are local : they are built and parameterized for particular popula-
tions at a given time to track their evolutionary trajectory for a few genera-
tions. In contrast, some of our questions on evolutionary processes have more
global scopes: do dierent populations or species of the same genus respond
to selection in a similar fashion? How far can one extrapolate the result
of a particular population-genetic model? Answers to these questions hinge
on the stability of the underlying causal structures, with one hypothesis be-
ing that dierent populations (or the same population at dierent times)
exhibit qualitatively similar evolutionary dynamics as far as they share the
same causal structure. The reported similarity in the patterns of genetic
and/or phenotypic correlations in related species of mammals (Young and
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Figure 4: Although causal structures are usually unobservable, they leave
some trace in the probability distribution they generate. In the above gure
(a), Z is expected to depend on its remote cause X (i.e, X 6? Z) but become
independent if we condition on the intermediate variable Y (X ? ZjY ). The
Markov condition generalizes this intuition and claims that any variable in
the graph becomes independent from its non-eects if conditioned on its di-
rect causes. It turns out the same condition implies, in the case of (b), that
X and Z are unconditionally independent but become dependent when con-
ditioned on Y (X ? Z but X 6? ZjY ). The causal search algorithms (Spirtes
et al., 1993; Pearl, 2000) exploit these relationships between causality and
probability to infer causal relationships among variables.
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Hallgrmsson, 2005) and of owers (Bissell and Diggle, 2010) indicates that
the conserved developmental structures generate a similar evolutionary dy-
namics in these populations. If this is a general phenomenon, causal models
may serve as units of induction of a broader scope, unifying evolutionary
dynamics of dierent populations.
The nal, but not least important, question is how causal structures
themselves evolve. Population-genetic models study changes in genetic and
phenotypic frequencies under the assumption of a xed causal structure, but
from a broader perspective these causal structures are themselves products
of evolution. Past studies have revealed cases of both wide-range homolo-
gies and radical changes in developmental mechanisms (e.g., True and Haag,
2001; Shubin et al., 2009). These empirical ndings prompt a theoretical
inquiry on laws that govern change and stasis of causal/developmental struc-
tures. Are these macro-evolutionary changes still in reach of the traditional
population genetics apparatus, or do they require a new approach? In the
causal modeling framework, qualitative changes in causal structure (G;F)
and quantitative changes in genetic or phenotypic distribution (P ) are dis-
tinguished, at least notationally. Whether they represent distinct evolution-
ary processes, however, is a question that awaits further theoretical as well
as empirical investigations. Given that developmental mechanisms are un-
derpinned by some genes, changes in causal parameters could in principle
be modeled as the epistatic evolution of regulative genes that control the
strength of causal relationships (Hansen and Wagner, 2001). Although the
complexity of nonlinear interactions and the sensitivity to local conditions
make predictions and analytical studies along this line dicult, some general
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insights may still be obtained through simulation studies (e.g., Jones et al.,
2014). Another possibility is that structural changes are caused by dierent
kinds of genes; Carroll (2005), for example, suggests that major dierences
among species are attributed to variation in cis-regulatory regions, and that
evolution in regulatory structure obeys dierent dynamics than that of the
coding regions as modeled in population genetics (but see also Hoekstra and
Coyne, 2007).
With these three questions the EES introduces an additional layer of re-
search methodology, putting forward a two-story view of evolutionary theory
where each level deals with dierent timescales, ontological units, and epis-
temic goals. Traditional population genetics constitutes the rst layer of this
extended picture which focuses on micro-scale quantitative changes in ge-
netic and phenotypic frequencies in a xed environment. The second layer,
on the other hand, examines conditions and assumptions of these quantita-
tive analyses by attending to the underlying causal structures and evolution
thereof. It asks, for instance, how developmental homology or various types
of organism-environment interactions are established and conserved, and
how they aect evolutionary dynamics of local populations. The focus here
is more on breadth than depth, or on qualitative characterizations of large-
scale evolutionary trends rather than qualitatively accurate predictions of
particular populations.
The two-story methodology is a corollary of the extended ontological
framework discussed above. Introducing causal/developmental structures as
additional ontological units beside genes and treating developmental plastic-
ity, inclusive inheritance, niche construction, and so on, as irreducible prop-
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erties of such units requires a matching methodology to study the causal
and evolutionary implications of those units. Inversely, if these phenomena
turned out to be well handled by extrapolation of the existing methodology,
no addition would be needed to the ontological inventory of evolutionary
theory. The extensions of the ontology and methodology of evolutionary
theory are, therefore, two sides of the same coin of the proposed new \con-
ceptual framework." From this perspective, the success of the EES depends
on whether it can provide a productive and unied research program that
integrates various evolutionary phenomena in a way not captured by the tra-
ditional methodology. This section has sketched a few research directions
suggested from the causal modeling framework, though they are admittedly
partial and possibly biased interpretations of the EES project as a whole.
Unifying all these approaches under the same methodological framework is a
challenging task, but will be essential for the EES to become a new synthesis
of evolutionary studies.
5 Quo Vadis?
This chapter has compared conceptual frameworks of evolutionary theory
in terms of their ontological and methodological assumptions, with a special
focus on the Modern Synthesis and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis.
From this perspective, the debate between the MS and the EES can be seen
as a reductionist vs. anti-reductionist tug-of-war in evolutionary biology.
The MS is characterized by its reductionist tendency, trying to represent
and study organismal features and evolutionary phenomena in terms of un-
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derlying genes. Genes (and other gene-like entities) are the exclusive build-
ing blocks of evolution, so that all complex evolutionary mechanisms and
macro-evolution can and must be captured through elaborations or extrap-
olations of the current population-genetic models. Proponents of the EES
contest this view by pointing out that the phenomena they call constructive
development cannot be reduced to just properties of the genome. Rather,
they are properties of causal structures which, as higher-level units of evo-
lution, prompt new lines of research questions that demand an alternative
approach.
Where does the debate go from here? I for one doubt there is a single or
a handful of empirical litmus tests that would settle the issue once and for
all. When the contention concerns dierent conceptual frameworks, such a
Popperian falsication is the last thing we could hope for. But that does
not mean we should be Kuhnian fatalists and accept that debates between
two dierent paradigms do not come to an end until one of them dies out.
A more constructive picture would be to view the MS and the EES as
two competing research programs in the sense of Lakatos (1980). A research
program, according to Lakatos, consists of its core tenets or \hard core" and
a \protective belt" that relates the core claims to empirical data or tests.
When results from the tests do not turn out as expected, or unpredicted
phenomena are observed, researchers rarely give up the hard core of their
theory but try to accommodate anomalies by modifying the protective belt.
In this way the same research program can change and \evolve" in the face
of apparent diculties while keeping its central claim intact.
The gene-centric ontology and methodology constitute the hard core of
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the Modern Synthesis. Historically this program faced several challenges,
including neutral evolution, the problem of altruism, and punctuated equi-
librium, to name a few, but each time it survived to evolve by modifying its
protective belt (e.g., drift as an important evolutionary process, the concept
of inclusive tness, etc.). In this sense it was a progressive program, and
this history of past successes underlies the expectation of many that the
current challenge from the EES can also be handled by a similar maneuver
| as new \add-ons" to the same hard core. In contrast, proponents of the
EES are skeptical and complain that the handling of the MS program of
complex developmental and environmental interactions has begun to show
a sign of degeneration, issuing ad-hoc patches just to save its core doctrines
but without leading to novel research questions or predictions. What we
need is not supercial treatment but major surgery of the hard-core ontol-
ogy and methodology, and only within a renewed research program can we
appreciate the full evolutionary implications of these mechanisms, or so they
argue.
The question we should ask, therefore, is not which research program
is correct, but rather which is more progressive and oers novel predictions
and insights on evolution. From this perspective, the challenge for the MS
is not just to show the consistency of phenomena like developmental plas-
ticity, inclusive inheritance, etc., with its core framework, but to devise a
suite of auxiliary theories that provide novel insight into these phenomena
from the gene-centered perspective, just as it did in the cases of neutral
theory and inclusive tness theory. In contrast, what is needed for the EES
camp is to provide eective means to bring its core tenets to actual scientic
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investigations along the direction it envisages. Provided that constructive
development and reciprocal causation are ubiquitous and important, how
can we forge these concepts into an empirical hypothesis that makes testable
predictions? In the dawn of the Modern Synthesis, population genetics has
served as a formal platform both to quantitatively verify Darwin and Wal-
lace's idea of natural selection (which was at its time quite dubitable) , and
to stimulate subsequent investigations, say, on the amount and the source
of genetic variation in natural populations. Can the EES provide a similar,
unifying theoretical framework? Recent works on Evo-Devo, epigenetic in-
heritance, and complex organism-environment interactions have laid seeds of
hitherto neglected or marginalized research directions; whether these seeds
grow into a new progressive research program or get incorporated as an
auxiliary \protective belt" of the existing one hinges on future conceptual,
theoretical, and empirical investigations.
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